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May )d., 1969
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
ABM
The debate on the Safeguard ABM that has occurred to date and the
testimonv that has been given have resulted in a conflic t and not a consensus
of views.

No confluence of opinion has developed, no winnowing process has

v et clearly divided the convincing from the confusing.

As far as the techni-

cal merits of the Safeguard system are concerned we do not vet have t he l ucid
guidelines we need for a prudent jndgment.
To be sure , there has been a consensuE of sorts.

There is virt ual

unanimity, for example, that an ABM sys t em for t he protection of ci t ies would
not be much good against an all-out nuclear attack and there is substantial
agreement that regardless of what decision is made with respect to deplovment,
research and development of anti-missile defenses should continue.
The differences over the technical efficacy of Safeguard constitute, however, only one segment of the problem.
our

deplo~rmen t

More significant is whether

of Safeguard will upset international stability , whether it

will provoke an escalation in t he arms race, and whether it will assis t or
handicap proposed negotiations with tbeSoviet Union on strategic delivery
vehicles.
One of the critical questions for which we s eek an answer is:
Will the deployment of t he Safeguard provoke anot her round in the arms race?
Will it be escalatory?

It has become virt ually a t ruism that arms races a r e

dangerous and can l ead to war .

It is even more significant t hat they can b e

v ery costly in terms of national resources and that , despite

~he

cost, after

each upward spi r al is t urned by the competitors in t he race , the securi ty of
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none is any greater.

All too frequently, the rivals continue to balance each

other, only at a more heavily armed and more expensive level.

Arms racing,

in short, can be an extravagant futility for all concerned.
The United States admittedly has at times been a victim of the
temptation to dissipate its resources in arms racing.

The "bomber gap" of

the fifties and the "missile gap" of the early sixties are well known instances
in which the United States reacted to what were thought to be weapons advances
on the other side but which later did not materialize.

The Soviet government,

too, has frequently reacted by expansions of its strategic weapons with the
aim of matching or even outrunning the United States.

There is no evidence

that the action-reaction syndrome has been purged from the psychology of
either the United States or the Soviet Union.

A provocative weapons advance

on either side today can be expected to trigger very much the same kind of
counter-reaction as it did five, ten or fifteen years ago.
Yet we slowly learn.

One of the more encouraging aspects of the

current Safeguard proposal is the conscious effort of American defense officials to devise a weapons system that is intended to be non-provocative and
non-escalatory.

The President, the Secretary of Defense and other officials

have portrayed the installation of the Safeguard as a defensive not an offensive measure and have concluded, as the President has said, that "the Soviet
Union cannot interpret this as esca:J£ting the arms race."

Unfortunately , the

conclusion does not necessarily derive from t he premise.
Distinctions between so-called "offensive" and "defensive" weapons
are often semantic, not real.

During negotiations in the League of Nations

in the 1920's and 30's the attempt to distinguish between such weapons was
a failure, one which contributed importantly to the stillbirth of those
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Although "defensive," the Safegtard system is designed to

protect and preserve an "offensive" weapon.

How the Soviet government chooses

to react may hinge very little on whether it perceives the Safeguard system
as "defensive" or "offensive" in a strictly military sense.

The fact is it

is another weapons svstem which has an impact on over-all strategic and political relations.

The Soviet Union

ma~r

well conclude that it has to compensate

for this American initiative, not so much because of military logic but because
of broader political imperatives.

All of our experience with the international

interaction between national military establishments leads to the conclusion
that we cannot be dogmatic in asserting that the Safeguard will not have an
escalatory effect.
cipate the opposite.

Indeed if we are calculating prudently, then we must antiIf it does, then, it could seriously prejudice endeavors

to arrive at an understanding with the Soviet government on limiting strategic
armaments.
There is also a serious question whether the Soviet government mav
not be engaged in a weapons deployment that could gravely prejudice the possibility of negotiating an agreement on strategic armaments.

I refer to its

deployment of the SS -9, an ICBM with a warhead reported to be as large as
20 to 25 megatons.

The Secretary of Defense has sought to justify the Safe-

guard proposal on the grounds that the SS -9 deployment indicates the Soviet
Union is striving for a first-strike capabilitv against the United States.
A certain portion of the Minuteman force must be safeguarded, he argues, in
order to insure its survival and to maintain our capability for assured
destruction against the Soviet Union.
I do not intend to take issue with the principle of assured destruction as the core of national deterrent policy.

Nor, if the alleged Soviet

- 4 threat is valid, do I necessarily quarrel with the thesis that it may be
desirable to defend a portion of our offensive strike force in order to make
certain we retain a capability of assured destruction.

But the suddenness

with which the threat of the SS-9 has been conjured up necessitates a close
examination.
It is disconcerting that Mr. Laird's disclosures come close on the
heels of another Department of Defense appraisal of the national strategic
posturethat was formulated in entirely different terms.

It is disturbing

that one Secretary of Defense can communicate to the Congress one intelligence conclusion regarding the Soviet Union and another Secretary of Defense
only two months later, presumably relying upon the same data, the same intelligence organization, and the same estimate, can arrive at a substantially
different conclusion.
The last posture statement of Secretary Clark Clifford, which
appeared in mid-January of this year, declares that "even against the
highest Soviet threat" projected in the National Int elligence Estimate , the
U. S. strategic forces programmed over the next few years could destroy in
a second strike more than two-fifths of the Soviet population and about threefourths of their industrial capacity.

This, the Secretary confirmed, was

sufficient assured destruction capability to comprise an adequate deterrent.
The Secretary warned, hov1ever, tha-,., we must be prepared t o cope
with unexpected developments in the Soviet strategic threat and take appropriate actions to hedge against them.

One of the unexpected contingencies

foreseen by the Secretary was the possibility of development of a Soviet
ICBM with target kill capability that would be able to destroy a large munber
of U. S. land-based missiles in hard silos.

But he saw no need to take

- 5 countermeasures against this possibilitv until there was evidence that the
threat was beginning to emerge.

Yet in March, Secretary Laird perceived

such a threat and decided t o revamp the Sentinel system not only by changing
the object of its defense from the cities to Minuteman, but also by placing
the emphasis on the Soviet Union, rather than Communist China, as the principal adversary.

The villain responsible for this switch in scripts was the

SS-9 which was described as being deployed at a menacing rate.
But the SS-9 is nothing new.

Its existence has been known for

some years and its increasing deployment has been observed.

Did some new

element suddenly stimulate t he fears of the Defense Secretary?

He mentioned

evidence as recent as last December of Soviet deployment of the SS -9.

But

are we to believe that Secretary Clifford's assessment in January was not
made with full awareness of the

SS-9 deployment and its potential?

If the

Defense Department in January deemed t hat the Soviet deployment of SS -9's
implied such a formidable threat to our offensive missiles, if they considered
it a first-strike force, why did not Secretanr Clifford's statement reflect
that judgment?
and March?

lfTas some radically new intelligence gained between January

Was a new estimate rnade bv the intelligence cormnunity which

dramatically enlarged the Soviet threat in those two intervening months?
I do not find in Secretary Laird's public utterances claims of either signifant new data or a new National Intelligence Estimate.
Since his first disclosure of the threat of the SS-9, the Defense
Secretary has asserted he referred only to a Soviet capability and not to
an intention.

Moreover, the Secretary of State has disclaimed a belief that

the Soviet government intends a first strike against the

Uni ·~ed

States.

any case the Defense Secretary is not referring to a Soviet first-strike

In

- 6 capability that exists now but only to one which might exist in the mid1970's, assuming that present trends of deployment continue over a period
of years.

He has in a word assumed just about the worst possible projection

of Soviet deployment and, then, has reacted as though it were certain to
become a reality.
But we have seen these projections of Soviet capabilities go a•rry
all too many times.

Too many times before we have over-reacted to a theo-

retical projection which never became a tangible fact.
the vell-known bomber and missile gaps.

I haveaready cited

I would also like to point out that

when the Sentinel ABM system was proposed in 1967 it was predicated on projections of Chinese and Soviet deployments which did not materialize. It
According to Secreta0r Laird,
was then estimated that theSoviet ICBM deployment would level off. /it did
not.

But now the Safeguard proposal is predicated on the assumption that it

will continue.

But what if it levels off?

There are many reasons to expect that it mi ght.

According to

Under Secretary of Defense Packard the Soviet ICBM force has attained "parity"
with our own, and it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union might
have sought this level as a precondition for negotiations on a strategic
arms agreement with the United States.

It would not be realistic on our

part to expect they would a gree to fre e ze armaments at less than parity.
And they are not so unrealis t ic as to dream that we would accept a ratio
that was unbalanced in their favor.
Both we and they should grasp and ponder the fact that we are at
a decisive milestone .
bet ween the two sides.
the other.

I

A state of approximate strategic balance now obtains
Each has sufficiency of strategic power to dete r

If at this critical moment either tries to gain an advantage by

- 7 introducing new strategic systems or by substantially enlarging existing
deployments, then the present stability could be upset.

And there would

be no prospect that it could be regained, at least not until another major
round in the arms race had been completed, perhaps years hence and at dire
economic , social and political costs.
The

i ~~ediate

manifestation of the deployment or non-deployment

of Safeguard will be its possible effects upon the long -pending negotiations
on strategic delivery vehicles.

I fear that the Safeguard proposal has

already had a baleful effect upon the decision to s t art these parleys.
major survey of defense policv which the new Administration

apparentl~,

The
is

now conducting seems to have become an obstacle to the diplomacy of "nonconfrontation and negotiation" which President Nixon established as the
main thrust of his Administration 's foreign policy.

"Late spring or early

surnmer"--the announced time for beginning the talks --is a vague deadline
which contrasts sharply with the trrgency of the hard sell to win approval
of appropriations for the Safeguard ABM in the fiscal year beginning Jul:'l 1.
The enthusiasm for building the weapon compares starkly with the dawdling
pace of the preparat ions alleged to be necessary for United States entrv
into the talks.

Actually preparations for strategic talks have been underway

for several years--the United States first made the proposal for freezing
strategic delivery vehicles in January 1964, and was ready t o start negotiating in the summer of last year.

'\fu;r

should it be necessary to pull everything

up by the roots again just to see if it is alive and well?
with the talks.

Let us set a date--a date in early June.

Let us get on
This will dispel

suspicion that the United States is reluctant to undertake the se talks and
is

orf.!

i 11

favor of expanding than constricting the arms race.

- 8 On April 25, I inserted in the Congressional Record a chart comparing the relative nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet
Union.

Shown rather p;raphically is the growth rate that has maintained this

balance of nuclear terror; it is an ugly picture that has not changed signi ficantly for vears.

In the same insertion, I suggested that in view of the

questions raised about the feasibility of t he system, its exorbitant costs,
etc., rather than begin the Safeguard deployment even in a limited fashion
it would be a better course at this time to hold off this phase pending a
good faith effort to open disarmament talks with the Soviet Union.

At the

same time I said our missile defense research and development efforts could
go forward, thereby keeping viable the option to begin a deployment if and
when it is clear that talks will not be productive and that the Safeguard
system is technologically feasible.
The need now, it seems to me, is to move promptly on negotiations
and to try to maximize the chances for their success.
be helpful if talks were

b e~un

To t hat end, it might

bv the Soviet and the United States with

simultaneous declarations calling for an int erim moratorium on fur t her
deployment of all strategic weapons.

It would be my hope that this nation

would consider taking the ini t iative by inviting the Soviet Union to join us
without delay in a temporary freeze of this kind pending t alks 1vhich 1wuld be
desif ned to make the freeze permanent.

In tha t fashion both nations would

underscore the mutuality of interest which can exist--which, in fact, does
exist--in bringing to a close this costly, wasteful and futile competi t ion
in nuclear armament s.

It would b e my f ur t her hope that the initiat ive which

is suggested would be pursue d by the Executive Branch before t he consideration
of the Safeguard deployment reaches a point of no r eturn in the Senate .

United Stales
of .America
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Vol. 115

No. 77

Senate
The Senate met at 11:30 a.m., and was
called to order by the President pro
tempore.
The Chapla.ln, the Reverend Edward L.
R . Elson, DD., otrered the following
prayer:
Trust in the Lord with all thine heart;
and lean not upon thine own understanding . Proverbs 3: 5.

Almighty 000. we thank Thee this day
that Thou hast gathered our people into
a great nation and established their freedom under Thy sovereignty, Let not our
goodly heritage fade or the bright vision
of service to all mankind be disowned.
Deepen the root of our life in everlasting
righteousness. Make us equal to our high
trust; reverent in the use of freedom;
just in the exercise of power; generous in
the protection of the weak. May wisdom
and ·morality be the stability of our
times; and our deepest trust be in Thee,
Lord of the nations and King of Kings.
Amen.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under

the order of yesterday, the Chair recognizes the distinguished maJority leader,

the Senator from Montana <Mr. MANs-

I'DILDl, for not exceeding 20 minutes.
The Senator from Montana..
THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent tha.t the reading of
the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, May 12, 1969, be dispensed with.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that all committees
be authorized to meet dur 1g the session
of the Senate today.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
ABM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the

debate on the Safeguard ABM that has
occurred to date and the testimony that

has been given have resulted in a conflict and not a consensus of views. No
confluence of opinion has developed, no
winnowing process has yet clearly divided
the convincing from the confusing. As
far as the technical merits of the Safeguard sl'stem are concerned, we do not
yet have the lucid guidelines we need for
a. prudent judgment.
To be sure, there has been a consensus
of sorts. There is virtual unaninUty, for
example, that an ABM system for the
protection of cities would not be much
good against an all-out nuclear attack
and there is substantial agreement that,
regardless of what decision is made with
respect to deployment, research and development of antlmissUe de!enses should
continue.
The dltrerences over the technical efficacy of Safeguard constitute, however,
only one segment of the problem. More
significant is whether our deployment of
Safeguard w111 upset international stability, whether it w111 provoke an escalation in the arms race, and whether It will
assist or handicap proposed negotiations
with the Soviet Union on strategic delivery vehicles.
One of the critical questions for which
we seek an answer is: Wlli the deployment of the Safeguard provoke another
round in the arms race? Wlli It be
escalatory? It has become virtually a
truism that arms races are dangerous and
can lead to war. It is even more
significant that they can be very costly in
terms of national resources and that,
despite the cost, after each upward spiral
is turned by the competitors in the race,
the security of none is any greater. All too
frequently, the rivals continue to balance each other, only at a more heavily
armoo and more expensive level. Arms
racing, in short, can be an extravagant
futility for all concerned.
The United States admittedly has at
times been a victim of the temptation to
dissipate !Ls resources in arms racing.
The "bomber gap" of the fifties and the
"missile gap" of the early sixties are wellknown instances in which the United
States reacted to what were thought to be
weapons advances on the other side but
which later did not materialize. The
Soviet Government, too, has frequently
re~ted by expansions of its strategic
weapons with the aim of matching or

even outrunhlng the United States. There
is no evidence that the action-reaction
syndrome has been purged from the
psychology of either the United States or
the Soviet Union. A provocative weapons
advance on either side today can be expected to trigger very much the same kind
of counterreact!on as it did 5, 10, or 15
years ago.
Yet we slowly learn. One of the more
encouraging aspects of the current Safeguard proposal is the conscious etrort of
American defense officials to devise a
weapons system that is intended to be
nonprovocatlve and nonescalatory. The
President, the Secretary of Defense, and
other officials have portrayed the installation of the Safeguard as a defensive,
not an offensive, measure and have concluded, as the President has said, that
"the Soviet Union cannot interoret this as
escalating the arms race." Unfortunately,
the conclusion does not necessarily derive
from the premise.
Distinctions between so-called "otrens1ve" and "defensive" weapons are often
semantic, not real. During negotiations
in the League of Nations in the 1920's and
1930's the attempt to distinguish between
such weapons was a failure, one which
contributed importantly to the stlllb!rth
of those negotiations. Although "defensive," the Safeguard system is designed
to protect and preserve 'a n "otrensive"
weapon. How the Soviet Government
chooses to react may hinge very little on
whether it perceives the Safeguard system as "defensive" or "otrensive" in a
strictly military sense. The fact is it is another weapons system which has an Impact on overall strategic and political relations. The Soviet Union may well conclude that it has to compensate for this
American initiative, not so much because
of military logic but because of broader
political imperatives. All of our experience with the international interaction
between national mllltary establishments
leads to the conclusion that we cannot be
dogmatic in assertin~ that the Safeguard
w111 not have an escalatory effect. Indeed,
if we are calculating prudently, then we
must anticipate the opposite. If it does,
then, Jt could seriously prejudice endeavors to arrive at an understanding with
the Soviet Government on limiting strategic armaments.
There is also a serious question whether
the Soviet Government may not be enS 5043
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gaged in a weapons deployment that
could gravely prejudice the possibility of
negotiating an agreement on st rategic
armaments. I refer to Its deployment of
the SS-9, an ICBM with a warhead reported to be as large as 20 to 25 megatons.
The Secretary of Defense has sought to
justify the Safeguard proposal on the
grounds that the SS-9 deployment indicates the Soviet Union is striving for a
first-strike capability against the United
States. A certain portion of the Minuteman force must be safeguarded, he argues, in order to insure its survival and to
m aintain our capability for assured destruction against th e Soviet Union.
I do not intend to take issue with the
principle of assured destruction as the
core of national deterrent policy. Nor, 1f
the alleged Soviet threat is valid, do I
necessarily quar r el with the thesis that
it may be desirable to defend a portion of
our o:!Iensive strike force in order to make
certain we retain a capability of assured
destruction. But t he 'Suddenness with
which the threat of the SS-9 has been
conjured up necessitates a close examination.
It is disconcerting that Mr. Laird's disclosures come close on the heels of another Department of Defense appraisal
of the national strategic posture that was
formulated in entirely different terms. It
is disturbing that one Secretary of Defense can communicate to the Congress
one in telligence conclusion regarding the
SOviet Union an d another Secretary of
Defense, only 2 months later, presumably
relying upon t h e same data, the same
intelligence organization, and the same
estimate, can arrive at a substantially
di.tferent conclusion.
The last posture statement of Secretary Cla rk Clitford, which appeared in
mJd- January of this year, declares that
"even against the highest Soviet threat"
projected in the national intelligence
estima te, the U.S . strategic forces programed over the n ext few years could
destroy in a second strike more than twofifths of the Soviet population and. about
three-fourths of their industrial capacIty. This, the Secrelalry confirmed, was
sufficient assured destruction capability
to comprise an adequate deterrent.
The Secreta ry warned, however, that
we must be prepared to cope with unexpected developm ents in the Soviet strategic threat and take appropriate actions
to hedge against them. One of the unexpected contingencies foreseen by the Secretary was the possibility of development
of a Soviet ICBM with a target kill capability that would be able to destroy a
large number of U.S. land-based missiles
in h ard silos. But he saw no need to take
countermeasures against this possibilit~
until there was evidenc that the threat
was beginning to emerge. Yet in March,
Secretary Laird perceived such a threat
and decided to revamp the Sentin el system not only by changing the object of
its defense from the cities to Minutem an ,
but also by placing the emphasis on the
Soviet Union, rather than CommUnist
China, as the prin cipal adversary. The
villain responsible for this switch 1n
scripts was the SS-9 which wa.~ described
as being deployed at a menadng rate.
But the 88-9 is nothing new. Its existence has been known for some years

and its increasing deployment has been
observed. Did some new element ;;uddenly stimulate the fears of the Defense
Secretary? He mentioned evidence as recent as last December of Soviet deployment of the SS-9. But are we to believe
that Secretary Clifford's assessment in
January was not made with full awareness of the 88-9 deployment and its potential? If the Defense Department in
January deemed that the Soviet deploym ent of 8S-9's implied s1:1ch a formidable
threat to our offensive missiles, if they
considered it a first-strike force, why did
not Secretary Clifford's statement reflect
that judgment? Was some radically new
intelligence gained between January and
March? Was a new estimate made by the
intelligence community which dramatically enlarged the Soviet threat in those
two intervening months? I do not find
in Secretary Laird's public utterances
claims of either significant new data or a
new national intelligence estimate.
Slnce his first disclosure of the threat
of the SS-9, the Defense Secretary has
asserted he referred only to a Soviet capability and not to an intention. Moreover, the Secretary of State has disclaimed a belief that the Soviet Government Intends a first strike against the
United States. In any case the Defense
Secretary is not referring to a Soviet
first-strike capability that exists now but
only to one which might exist 1n the mid1970's, assuming that present trends of
deployment continue over a period of
years. He has, in a word, assumed just
about the worst possible projection of
Soviet deployment, and then has reacted
as though it were certain to become a
reality.
But we have seen these projections of
Soviet capabilities go awry all too many
times. Too many times before we have
overreacted to a theoretical projection
which never became a tangible fact. I
have already cited the well-known
bomber and missile gaps. I would also
like to point out that when the Sentinel
ABM system was proposed in 1967, it was
predicated on projections of Chinese and
Soviet deployments which did not materialize. It was then estimated that the
Soviet ICBM deployment would level off.
According to Secretary Laird, It did not.
But now the Safeguard proposal is predicated on the assumption that it will continue. But what if it levels off?
There are many reasons to expect that
It might. According to Under Secretary
of Defense Packard the Soviet ICBM
force has attained "parity" with our
own, and it is reasonable to suppose that
the Soviet Union might have sought this
level as a precondition for negotiations
on a strategic arms agreement with the
United States. It would not be realistic on
our part to expect they would agree to
freeze armaments at less than parity.
And they are not so unrealistic as to
dream that we would accept a ratio that
was unbalanced in their favor.
Both we and they shoulp grasp and
ponder the fact that we are at a decisive
m!lestone. A state of approximate strategic balance now obtains between the
two sides. Each has sufficiency of strategic power to deter the other. If at this
critical moment either tries to gain an
advantage by introducing new strategic
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systems or by substantially enlarging existing deployments, then the presen t stability could be upset. And there would
be no prospect that It could be regain ed,
at least not untll another major round
1n the arms race had been completed,
perhaps years hence and at dire economic, social, and political costs.
The immediate manifestation of the
deployment or nondeployment of Safeguard w111 be its possible effects upon the
long-pending negotiations on strategic
delivery vehicles. I fear that the Safeguard proposal has already had a baleful
effect upon the decision to start these
parleys. The major survey of defense
policy which the new administration apparently is now conducting seems to have
become an obstacle to the diplomacy of
"nonconfrontation and negotiation"
which President Nixon established as the
main thrust of his administration's foreign policy. "Late spring or early summer"-the announced time for beginning
the talks--is a vague deadline which
contrasts sharply with the urgen cy of
the hard sell to win approval of appropriations for the Safeguard ABM in the
fiscal year beginningg July 1. The enthusiasms for building the weapon compares
starkly with the dawdling paee of t h e
preparations alleged to be necessary for
U.S. entry Into the talks. Actually prep arations for strategic talks h ave been
underway for several years--the United
States first made the proposal for freezing strategic delivery vehicles 1n January 1964, and was ready to start negotiating In the summer of last year. Why
should it be necessary to pull everything
up by the roots again just to see if 1t Is
alive and well? Let us get on with the
talks. Let us set a date-a date in early
June. This will dispel suspicion that the
United States Is reluctant to undertake
these talks and is more 1n favor of expanding than constricting the arms
race.
On April 25, I inserted in the CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD a chart comparing
the relative nuclear strength between
the United States and the Soviet Union .
Shown rather graphically is the growth
rate that has maintained this balance
of nuclear terror; it is an ugly picture
that has not changed· significantly for
years. In the same insertion, I suggested
that in view of the questions raised about
the fea.sibility of the system, its exorbitant costs, reliability, and so forth ,
rather than begin the Safeguard deployment even in a limit.ed fashion it would
be a better course at this time to hold off
this phase pending a good-faith effort to
open disarmament tall<._s with the Soviet
Union. At the same time I said our m issile
defense research and development efforts
could go forward, thereby keeping viable
the option to begin a deployment if
and when it is clear that talks will not
be productive and that the Safeguard
system is technologically feasible.
The need now, it seems to me, is to
~ove promptly on negotiations and to
try to maximize the chances for their
success. To that end, it might be helpful
If talks were begw1 .by the Soviet Union
and the United States, wi"th simultaneous
declarations calling for an itnerim moratorium on further deployment of all
str.a~_£ ~ons. It would be my hope
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that this Nation would consider taking
the initiative by inviting the Soviet Union to join us without delay in a temporary freeze of this kind pending talks
which would be designed to make the
freeze permanent. In that fashion both
n::Jtions would underscore the mutuality
of interest which can exist--which, in
fact, does exist-in bringing to a close
this costly, wasteful, and futile competition in nuclear armaments. It would
by my further hope that the initiative,
which is suggested, would be pw-sued by
the executive branch before the consideration of the Safeguard deployment
reaches a point of no return in the Senate.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the majority leader, the distinguished senator
from Montana, has given us a statement
on the implications that deployment of
an anti-ballistic-missile system at this
time would have for this country. He has
struck at the key issues with clarity and
wisdom.
Underneath the technical complexity
and difficult judgments about missile
technology lies a simple truth. It is thiswe are at a moment in time, the first
time in the quarter of a century of the
nuclear age, where it may be possible to
halt the nuclear arms race with all the
danger it holds for all our people and
for the world. Already, we are informed,
the equivalent in nuclear power of more
than 15 tons of TNT hovers over the
head of every man, woman, and child
on the earth.
·We who oppose deployment of the
M3M at this time are asking for a brief
delay in the arms race during which the
United States can enter into negotiations
with the Soviet Union to determine
whetner it is possible-either by formal
or tacit agreement-to halt the arms
race, or whether it is necessary to go
on as in the past, piling up more and
more deadly nuclear weapons.
The United States can defer deployment of the ABM for three principal reasons:
First. It presently has an overwhelming retaliatory capability-an ability to
destroy the Soviet Union. This capability
can be maintained eYen if the Soviet Union continues the development of nuclear weapons at its maximum capacity
through the mid-1970's.
Second. A reasonable analysis ·of the
intelligence available is that there is no
new or present danger to ow- deterrent.
Third. The ABM system proposed by
the administration, is the subject of so
much responsible doubt about its feasibility for mlssile site protection that a
delay of d eployment would ~erve the Nation well. The most efir,dive strategic
response to a real threat Lo our deterrent
could be developed in the time our Government is seeking a halt in the nuclear
arms race, rather than in haste to build
and deploy an ineffective system.
In conclusion, it is my hope that the
administration will heed the wise words
of the majority leader. There is no desire of those opposed to the ABM deployment to confront the administration politically. Reasonable solutions are still
possible. The United States can enter
into negotiations with the Soviet Union

with confidence in its existing and preponderant strength. The United States
can do so with the knowledge that if ne~
gotiations fail, we havP the resources and
time to do what is necessary to insure
the credibility of our deterrent and awesome, if uncertain, security.
It is my view that delay can be taken
in safety. It is my view that a brief delay to determine if a halt in the nuclear
weapons race is possible is the course of
reason, the course of responsibility, and
the duty of a great country.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
commend the distinguished Senator from
Kentucky for the brief statement he has
just made. He has said more in a few
words than I said in many. He has stated
the case better and more succinctly. I
join with him in the postulate that this
is not a political matter, that this is
something in which we are all vitally
interested regardless of politics, and tLat
those of us who oppose the system do
not doubt the honesty and integrity of
those who are in favor of it.
e is a matter of judgment which must
be faced up to and on which a decision
must be made. I join the Senator from
Kentucky in saying that we ought to
undertake to start negotiations if it is
at all possible, and that they ought to
be undertaken in good faith. If results
are not forthcoming and good faith is
not displayed, then we ought to get busy
and enlarge the de' errent.
I do not believe that a delay would
cause any difficulty. I think it would
yield much good. If an agreement to halt
arms race can be brought about through
the two superpowers, it would mean that
in this country we would be able to
divert funds to the needs of the cities
and to the needs of various segments of
aur population which must be met and
faced up to. In that way we shall bring
about a balance in our sense of responsibilities, which in the long run will re•
act to the welfare of this Nation as a
whole.
I again commend the distinguished
senior Senator from Kentucky, who has
taken the leadership in this matter over
several years and who has done a lot
of good groundwork to bolster the case
he has presented on occasion to the
Senate.
I assure the Senator once again that
this is not a political matter. It is not
a matter of a gain or loss for either the
Republican or Democratic Party. It 1s
a matter in the best interest of the
country. Regardless of its effect on either
party or on any candidate, it is the issue which should have priority at all
times.
Let us at least make an effort. Let us
go ahead and see if we cannot do something which would benefit mankind; Instead of continually building and bullding and acting and reacting with missiles
and other systems, which can do nothing
but bring destruction on mankind as a
whole.
We have a great responsibility ln the
Senate. Let us face up to it and build for
peace and not for disaster; or at least
Jet us try to move toward the elimination of that which Is designed to destroy
people.
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